At DeepSec 2011 Constantinos Patsakis and Kleanthis Dellios held a presentation titled “Patching Vehicle Insecurities”. They pointed out that the car is starting to resemble more to a computer with mechanical peripherals (incase you haven’t seen their talk, please do!). This is true for all types, not only the modern cars powered by electricity alone. But there is more. Modern cars are connected to networks (i.e. the Internet or the mobile phone network). This means that your method of transportation is part of the dreaded Internet of Things. Given the design flaws we have seen in talks given at DeepSec, there is no surprise that this is a breeding ground for major trouble. The Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club (ADAC), a German motoring association, discovered a lapse in the communication between BMW cars and the servers
The first recording of DeepSec 2014 has finished post-processing. Just in time for the holidays we have the keynote presentation by Alex Hutton ready for you. Despite its title “The Measured CSO” the content is of interest for anyone dealing with information security. Alex raises questions and gives you lots of answers to think about. Don’t stay in the same place. Keep moving. Keep thinking.
If you haven’t been at 44CON last week, you missed a lot of good presentations. Plus you haven’t been around great speakers, an excellent crew, “gin o’clock” each day, wonderful audience, and great coffee from ANTIPØDE (where you should go when in London and in desperate need of good coffee). Everyone occasionally using wireless connections (regardless if Wi-Fi or mobile phone networks) should watch the talks on GreedyBTS and the improvements of doing Wi-Fi penetration testing by using fake alternative access points. GreedyBTS is a base transceiver station (BTS) enabling 2G/2.5G attacks by impersonating a BTS. Hacker Fantastic explained the theoretical background and demonstrated what a BTS-in-the-middle can do to Internet traffic of mobile phones. Intercepting and re-routing text messages and voice calls can be done, too. Implementing the detection of fake base stations
Although I’m new in the Bitcoin world I had a quite promising start. Earlier this month I was able to visit the Bitcoin Conference in Amsterdam and had some very good conversations with core developers from the Bitcoin Foundation and to my honor also the chance to talk to Gavin Andreesen, long-time lead developer and now chief scientist of the Bitcoin Foundation. At DeepSec our first contact with Bitcoin was in 2012 when John Matonis, now Executive Director and Board Member of the Bitcoin Foundation, talked about the evolution of e-Money. But since then we hadn’t intense contact. Tomorrow I will visit the Bitcoin Expo in Vienna and hope to meet new people in the community and discuss the latest trends and developments. The fascinating thing about Bitcoin and the global block-chain is the
Leaks are problems you don’t want in your infrastructure. While this is clear for water pipes, it is not so clear for digital data. Copying is a part of the process, and copying data is what your systems do all day. A leak comes into existence when someone without access privileges gets hold of data. The industry has coined the term data leak/loss prevention (DLP) for products trying to stop intruders from ex-filtrating your precious files. Just like other defence mechanisms DLP systems cannot be bought and switched on. You have to know where your data lives, which software you use, what data formats need to be protected, and so on. We invited Andreas Wiegenstein to talk about data loss prevention in SAP systems. His presentation was held at the DeepSec 2013 conference and
For those who were not present at the DeepSec 2013 conference (shame on you!) we have compiled a selection of photographs taken at the event. Static imagery cannot give you the full experience, but maybe you want to drop by in 2014! Credits and our big thank you go to our graphic designer and our photographer!
Controls blocking the flow of data are an important tool of defence measures. Usually you need to enforce your organisation’s set of permissions. There are even fancy gadgets available to help you cope with data loss in terms of unauthorised access. This only works in controlled environments. Fortunately the modern IT policy allows intruders to bring their own tools in order to circumvent security controls. Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) is all the fashion these days, and it really helps evading defence mechanisms. At DeepSec 2013 Georgia Weidman of Bulb Security LLC talked about what you can do with mobile devices and what you have to address when protecting your data. „…Companies are putting a lot of faith in these security mechanisms to stop the threats to mobile devices. In this talk we put
Everybody makes mistakes. It’s no surprise that this statement applies to software development, too. When you deal with information security it is easy to play the blame game and say that the application developers must take care to avoid making mistakes. But how does software development work? What are the processes? What can go wrong? Answering these questions will give you an insight into ways to avoid being bitten by bugs. Peter af Geijerstam of Factor 10 talked about security mistakes in software development in his presentation held at the DeepSec 2013 conference. We recommend his presentation for everyone dealing with information security, not just software developers.
We live in a culture where everybody can have thousands of friends. Social media can catapult your online presence into celebrity status. While your circle of true friends may be smaller than your browser might suggest, there is one thing that plays a crucial role when it comes to social interaction: trust. Did you ever forget the password to your second favourite social media site? If so, how did you recover or reset it? Did it work, and were you really the one who triggered the „lost password“ process? In a world where few online contacts can meet each other it is difficult for a social media site to verify that the person requesting a new password is really the individual who holds the account. Facebook has introduced Trusted Friends to facilitate the identity
Appliances are being sold and used as security devices. The good thing about these gadgets is an improvement of your security (usually, YMMV as the Usenet folks used to write). The bad thing about inserting an unknown amount of code into your defence system are the yet to be discovered flaws in its logic. In the old days you have to do some reverse engineering in order to find these bugs. Modern technology bring you the Magic of the „Cloud“™ – virtual appliances! Since everything runs under a hypervisor nowadays, your appliances have been turned into binary images which can be moved around and started anywhere you like. At DeepSec 2013 Stefan Viehböck of SEC Consult spoke about the advantages of virtual appliances and their benefit for security analysis. It seems the „Cloud“ has
Securing your own perimeter is the prime task IT security teams are worried about. However there is Murphy’s Law of Firewalls, too. Given a sufficient amount of time, business requirements will pierce a lot of holes in your firewall and your defences. Once you work with suppliers, you will have to deal with their perimeters as well. Your opponents will go for the weakest link, and if the links on your end are strong, then they go for your suppliers and partners. Dave Lewis of Akamai Technologies will talk about this problem in his talk at DeepSec 2013. It’s not your immediate partners you have to think about. There are trading partner networks, code developed by off shore development centres and outsourced help desks. Even if you use security products you can get into
No man is an island. If this is true for every single one of us, then it is also true for companies. Modern enterprises have business to business (B2B) relations. They are at the centre of a network of suppliers and other vendors. Information flows between the players since they need to exchange data. What do you do if you deal with confidential or regulated data which mustn’t flow freely? How do you assess the risks? How do you determine what security measures work best? How do you deal with the situation of not enforcing security because every player runs its own policies? Luciano Ferrari has prepared a presentation for you and talks about his experience. The first issue is physical proximity. Once you are linked with business entities several thousands of miles away
Have you ever forgotten a password? It’s a safe bet to assume a yes. Sometimes we forget things. When it comes to logins there is usually a procedure to restore access and change the forgotten password to a known new one. This Forgot Your Password functionality is built into many applications. The mechanism is to rely on other ways to restore trust. There is a risk that unauthorised persons gain access to an account by exploiting the process. Ashar Javed has explored the password recovery function of 50 popular social networking sites. In his talk at DeepSec 2013 he will present the findings of his survey. The attack vector is called Trusted Friend Attack, because once you forgot your credentials you have to rely on trusted friends to recover them. Apart from automatic systems
The Joys of Detecting Malicious Software Malicious software is all around us. It permeates the Internet by riding on data transmissions. Once you communicate, you risk getting in touch with malware (another name for malicious software). This is why every single one of us, be it individual, company or organisation, runs anti-virus software. The idea is to have specialised software detect malware, so all the bad things are kept out of your network and away from your end-points. So much for the theory. In practice any self-respecting attacker can evade anti-virus filters by a variety of means, depending on their skills and resources. Security researchers know about this fact. Stuxnet and Flame were a proof for sceptics (and a failure of the whole anti-virus industry). How can this be? Well, Attila Marosi (GovCERT Hungary)
Unless you buy ready-made exploits or do security research (you know, the tedious task of testing systems and code, findings bugs and assessing their impact) you may wonder where they come from. To show you how to exploit a vulnerability and how to get to an exploit, we have asked Georgia Weidman for an example. She will be conducting the Hands On Exploit Development training. Early in my infosec education I took a class with a lab portion systems with known vulnerabilities. One system that I had difficulty exploiting was a Windows 7 host with HP Power Manager 4.2.6 which is subject to CVE-2009-2685. There is no Metasploit Module for this issue, but I was able to find some public exploit code on Exploit-db. The exploit calls out explicitly that it has been tested