Have you ever asked these questions? You are using the latest mobile and using your laptop with the latest and patched OS, running antivirus: Do you need to worry about security? Isn’t there still something broken in the entire security and permission model? Why can the desktop application, that is not an internet browser, access and communicate by using any IP address? Why can the application access your whole filesystem and collect the files from there? Why can an android app with internet permission communicate using any arbitrary IP, even a private one? Why can the app communicate by using different domains? Isn’t the app market ecosystem creating a friendly environment for botnets? This talk will shed some light on these issues and propose some mitigation strategy. We have asked Martin a few more
Android’s accessibility API was designed to assist users with disabilities, or temporarily preoccupied users unable to interact with a device, e.g., while driving a car. Nowadays, many Android apps rely on the accessibility API for other purposes, including apps like password managers but also malware. From a security perspective, the accessibility API is precarious as it undermines an otherwise strong principle of sandboxing in Android that separates apps. By means of an accessibility service, apps can interact with the UI elements of another app, including reading from its screen and writing to its text fields. As a consequence, design shortcomings in the accessibility API and other UI features such as overlays have grave security implications. This talk will provide a critical perspective on the current state of Android accessibility and selected UI security features.
The Marshmallow version was a significant revision for Android. Among the new features that were introduced one of the most significant is, without any doubt, the runtime permission. The permission model was totally redesigned, categorising the permissions into four main categories. The main concept of this categorisation is how much risk a user is exposed to when permissions are granted. Therefore, normal permissions imply the least risk for the user. However, in this case, there are some important issues. Firstly, these permissions are not actually displayed to the user; they are not displayed upon installation and the user needs to dig into several menus to find them for each app. Most importantly though, these permissions cannot be revoked. Unlike permissions categorized as dangerous, where the user can grant or revoke a permission whenever deemed
The world’s gone mobile. Mobile devices have surpassed the standard computer (i.e. desktop) installation multiple times. In turn this means that you will encounter these devices most definitely when testing or implementing security measures. Usually adversaries do not use the platform itself. They use software to gain entry. This is why mobiles apps are the most preferred way of delivering the attacks today. Understanding the finer details of mobile app attacks is soon becoming an essential skill for penetration testers as well as for the app developers & testers. This is why we have a special training for you at DeepSec 2017. So, if you are an Android or an iOS user, a developer, a security analyst, a mobile pen-tester, or just a mobile security enthusiast the training ‘Mobile App Attack’ is of definite
DeepSec 2016 Talk: Obfuscated Financial Fraud Android Malware: Detection And Behavior Tracking – Inseung Yang
In Korea in particular, hackers have distributed sophisticated and complex financial fraud android malware through various means of distribution, such as SMS phishing, Google play, compromised web servers and home routers (IoT). In some cases, both smartphone and PC users are targeted simultaneously. Inseung Yang and his team collect mobile android malware via an automated analysis system, detect obfuscations and malicious packer apps. In his presentation Inseung Yang will describe trends of malicious android apps and obfuscated mobile malware in Korea. He’ll explain the policy methods for Korean mobile banking and the attack methods used by hackers, f.ex. the stealing of certifications, fake banking apps that require the security numbers issued to users when they open their accounts, Automatic Response Service(ARS) phishing attacks in conjunction with Call Forwarding, and the requesting of the One Time Password(OTP) number. But
The Stagefright exploit haunts the Android platform. The vulnerability was published in Summer 2015. It gives attackers a way to infect Android smartphones by using multimedia files such as pictures, text, and videos. This is a perfect vector since most people will look at media instantly. Dr. Aleksandr Yampolskiy gave a presentation at DeepSec 2010 about malicious software hidden in multimedia (the talk was aptly titled Malware goes to the Movies). So what if there are more bugs like this in the Android platform? Enter fuzzing technology. Alexandru Blanda spoke at DeepSec2015 about fuzzing on the Android platform. This approach can be used to uncover different types of vulnerabilities inside multiple core system components of the Android OS. Since these vulnerabilities affect critical components of the Android system, the impact of the results will