DeepSec 2013 Talk: Easy Ways To Bypass Anti-Virus Systems

René Pfeiffer/ October 31, 2013/ Conference, Security, Stories

The Joys of Detecting Malicious Software Malicious software is all around us. It permeates the Internet by riding on data transmissions. Once you communicate, you risk getting in touch with malware (another name for malicious software). This is why every single one of us, be it individual, company or organisation, runs anti-virus software. The idea is to have specialised software detect malware, so all the bad things are kept out of your network and away from your end-points. So much for the theory. In practice any self-respecting attacker can evade anti-virus filters by a variety of means, depending on their skills and resources. Security researchers know about this fact. Stuxnet and Flame were a proof for sceptics (and a failure of the whole anti-virus industry). How can this be? Well, Attila Marosi (GovCERT Hungary)

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DeepSec 2013 Talk: Europe In The Carna Botnet – Telnet’s Threat To The Largest Economy

René Pfeiffer/ September 21, 2013/ Conference, Security

Botnets have been around since 1999. These herds of networked and compromised systems (called zombies) are the tool of the trade for many groups. It’s the  zombie outbreak of the information age. The analysis of existing botnets is an important task of security researchers around the globe. The study of the malware involved, the infection process and the inter-node communication of the infected systems is crucial for the dismantling of the botnet. Therefore we are happy to present Parth Shukla’s talk on the Carna botnet. It was created by an anonymous hacker to create a census of the (IPv4) Internet. Parth has been analysing the devices that formed part of the Carna Botnet. The data concerning the devices was provided by the anonymous researcher. He has distributed the relevant data to many CERTs and

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DeepSec 2012 Talk: The „WOW Effect“

René Pfeiffer/ October 24, 2012/ Conference

If you have ever been in the position of analysing the remains of a compromised system, then you will probably know that a lot of forensic methods rely on data stored in file systems. Of course, you can always look at individual blocks, too, however sooner or later you will need the logical structure of the data. The question is: Do you rely on the file system to be honest with you? What happens if the file system (with a little help from the OS around it) tricks you into believing false information? The answer is easy. Your investigation will fail. Christian Wojner from CERT.at has a presentation for you which describes the stunning „WOW Effect“ stemming from Microsoft’s WoW64 technology. WoW64 is the abbreviation for Windows 32-bit on Windows 64-bit. It allows 64-bit

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DeepSec 2012 Workshop: Malware Forensics and Incident Response Education (MFIRE)

René Pfeiffer/ September 24, 2012/ Conference, Training

Malicious software is the major tool for attackers. It is used to deliver the payload so that compromised systems can be exploited and secured for executing further tasks by your adversaries. Getting to now this malicious software and finding traces of the breach is very important for dealing with a security event. Proper incident response must be part of every state-of-the-art defence strategy. So this is why we offer the Malware Forensics and Incident Response Education (MFIRE) training at DeepSec 2012. Ismael Valenzuela will be your teacher for this course. The workshop is a proactive weapon to help you normalize your environment after a negative event has occurred. Your opponents have increasingly sophisticated tools and backdoor programs at their disposal to steal your intellectual property and expose sensitive information – all with the ability

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Collateral Damage in Cyberspace

René Pfeiffer/ June 8, 2012/ High Entropy, Security

„In cyberspace, no one can hear you scream.“ System administrators know this already for a long time, as do security researchers. Everybody is talking about „cyberwar“ these days (elections are coming). No one is talking about the (digital) fallout from „cyberwar“ operations. Unless you solely rely on passive methods, there’s not much that can happen. As soon as you employ „offensive security“, which is just an euphemism for „breaking things“, there will be damage in terms of service disruption, compromised systems, modified/erased data, inserted attack code and possibly more. Attack tools such as Stuxnet, Duqu and now Flame have been discussed for years by security researchers. Especially anti-virus vendors have repeatedly promised to include malware of any origin in their databases. In theory this includes these „cyberweapons“ as well. In real life these weapons

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Pattern, Matching and IT Folklore

René Pfeiffer/ April 15, 2012/ Discussion, High Entropy, Security

Every once in a while there is a lively discussion about the efficiency of pattern-based security measures. Usually you see these discussions in the wake of security software tests. Mostly it concerns intrusion detection, malware filter or spam filter tools. As soon as you are trying to implement filters or detection, you will need some criteria to base decisions on. It doesn’t matter if you apply whitelisting, blacklisting or a mixture of both. Even if you add some intricate algorithms ranging from good ideas to artificial intelligence you still need to base the decision on something. Patterns and signatures is still the way to go. So why do these discussion about „all methods using patterns/signatures are snake oil“ stem from? Let’s take another pattern-based defence mechanism as an example – our immune systems. It

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Lessons in Trust and Malicious Code from the Staatstrojaner

René Pfeiffer/ October 31, 2011/ Security

Since it is Halloween we will beat an undead horse in our blog today. Zombies are all the fashion both in literature and on your computer. The question is: Are all zombies alike? Are there good and bad zombies, or only bad ones? How can you distinguish between good and evil intentions if all you got is a compromised system? It all boils down to trust, and the zombie in question is (again) the German Federal Trojan („Staatstrojaner“). The German magazine Telepolis published an article that compares the statement of Jörg Ziercke, the head of the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA), to the words of Rudyard Kipling’s python Kaa. The basis for this analogue are Mr. Ziercke’s claims stem from leaked notes of his speech in the commission of the German

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Talk: FakeAntiVirus – Journey from Trojan to a Persisent Threat

René Pfeiffer/ October 26, 2011/ Conference

You run the latest software defending you against malicious code. You have your best filters deployed. Your firewalls are tight as granite. Your crypto is flawless. Your authentication is watertight. But you’re still being attacked and have probably been compromised. What happened? There’s always the attack vector through social engineering. Combine this with a web site or a dialogue box that warns your staff about a potential security breach and tricks them into installing code manually, most commonly by disguising as Anti Virus software (hence the name FakeAntiVirus). Infection can be done by browser plug-in / add-on (think toolbars or other convenient items) or more complex means. Once the tool is installed, it takes control of your system(s), phones home or does other tasks as told by its new owner. Provided the cover is

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Dissection of Malware and Legality

René Pfeiffer/ October 24, 2011/ Discussion, Security

You have probably seen the articles about the 0zapftis (a.k.a. the German Federal Trojan) malware used by the German police for investigation. There’s a lot going on in Germany and the German parliament, so we’d like to point out the issue of dissecting governmental malware and its relation to common sense and the law. The politician Patrick Sensburg accused the Chaos Computer Club to have thwarted investigations and thus the punishment of potential perpetrators. This violates German law (§ 258 Strafvereitelung, to be exact, description is in German). So is it legal to analyse malicious software or is it illegal? Mr. Sensburg has already answered three questions regarding his statements in parliament. He clarified his message. He criticises that the code had been published on the Internet instead of contacting the appropriate government agencies.

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Talk: Behavioral Security: 10 steps forward 5 steps backward

René Pfeiffer/ October 17, 2011/ Conference

How do you distinguish good from evil? Have you ever asked yourself this question? In order to avoid diving into philosophy let’s translate evil to harmful and good to harmless. What’s your strategy to find out if something is harmful or harmless? When it comes to food maybe you try a small bit and gradually increase the dose. This strategy fails for software since you cannot install a bit of code and install more if everything looks ok. Analysing the behaviour is the next analogy in line. Behavioural analysis is well-known to anthropologists, psychologists and most human resources departments. Does is work for code, too? If you look at your security tools you will probably find tools that use a rule-based approach; then there are signatures and some tools offer to detect/decide based on

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0zapftis revisited – 0ktoberfest for Security Researchers

René Pfeiffer/ October 11, 2011/ High Entropy, Odd

The CCC analysis of the malicious software bought and used by the German government has put our blog schedule and RSS reading habits out of balance. Frankly our necks hurts because we constantly shake our heads since the PDF of the analysis was published. We have talked to journalists who showed interested in the design of the malware. It’s very hard not to go into rant or BOFH mode when talking about the design and the use of the trojan horse. You have to use quite some Zen skills to stay focused and to see what we have here. In fact the whole discovery and the avalanche of questions raining down on German officials marks a turning point for the significance of computer security. Furthermore it is a perfect example of all the problems

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Analysis of Governmental Malware

René Pfeiffer/ October 9, 2011/ Odd, Security, Stories

There is a ongoing discussion about the use of malicious software for criminal investigations. German and Austrian agencies use the term „Online-Durchsuchung“ (online search) or „Quellen-Telekommunikationsüberwachung“ (source telecommunications surveillance) for investigative measures that cover the source of telecommunication messages (which is usually a suspect’s computer or telephone). In context with malicious software used for this purpose the unofficial term „Bundestrojaner“ (federal trojan horse) was coined. On 27 Februar 2008 the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the online search and Internet surveillance rules violate the German constitution and have to be reviewed (you can read the explanation of the Court in German here). Yesterday the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) published a detailed analysis of a „lawful interception malware“. The results have a profound impact on security since the design of the malware allows attackers

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Talk: An online Game Trojan Framework from China Underground Market

René Pfeiffer/ September 14, 2011/ Conference

Malware infecting computers always serves a purpose. Zombies, as infected systems are called, usually connect to a Command & Control channel and receive their orders from the owners of the zombie herd. Malicious software can also be used as a tool for retrieving information. Some of these tools are specialised and look for specific data such as login credentials. At DeepSec 2011 Hermes Li will explain how a trojan horse designed for stealing user information is installed, how it works and give a short introduction into the Chinese underground market. The talk will also discuss parts of the code, DLL injection and the packer encryption. There is a market for most stolen data. When it comes to games there is even real money in data trafficking. In-game goods (items, currencies, …) can be sold,

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Thoughts about Threats by „Virtual Bombs“

René Pfeiffer/ May 22, 2011/ Security

The German  Federal Minister of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, has warned „that it is only a question of time until criminal gangs and terrorists have virtual bombs at their disposal“. While the term „virtual bomb“ is very vague by itself, the minister mentioned „malware“ as well. This is no surprise for security researchers. Malicious software has already been used for attacking companies. The infrastructure of whole countries has been attacked as well. Logic bombs have been used in the past, but they have never been used to wage warfare. They have been used for revenge by disgruntled employees or for blackmailing someone (as the ransomware malware also does). Tools like this are used for very specific purposes (such as espionage or targeted destruction), but never for an all-out assault. Even a (D)DoS often has

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The Antivirus-Virus Conundrum

René Pfeiffer/ February 15, 2011/ Security

Last week the EU’s statistics office published statistical data about the state of anti-virus protection and virus infections. According to the figures nearly a third of Europe’s PCs carry some kind of malware. Although it is difficult to assess the accuracy or methods of studies, this figure is hardly surprising. Anyone who has ever dealt with filtering messages, web content or any other data entering the perimeter of your network knows about the positives and negatives, be them false or true. The problem starts with UBE/UCE (a.k.a. spam) filtering and continues right into the domain of malware. Just as their biological counterparts a computer malware, indiscriminately called virus, changes its shape and flavour. We had a talk from Joan Calvet about the Tripoux project. They analyse malware packers. If you have seen the branch

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