Press Release: Low-tech Attacks. Critical Infrastructure poorly secured – Attacks against Colonial Pipeline used Standard Access Tools

Sanna/ May 20, 2021/ Press, Training/ 0 comments

In May, the operator of the US Colonial Pipeline was the victim of a ransomware attack. After such reports, calls for better security and additional measures are always loud. In fact, analyzes of these attacks often reveal deficiencies in basic security. Often it is not even necessary to use complicated and sophisticated tools to attack critical infrastructure. Attackers like to use standard tools that are available everywhere so as not to attract attention. The lack of basic security makes it possible. Custom camouflage When defending your own systems and networks, it is necessary to know exactly what the infrastructure is like. Organized groups that attack companies research exactly what is being used at the target before the attack. According to this planning phase, only tools are used that are plausible to the victim and

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DeepSec2017 U21 Talk: Lessons Learned: How To (Not) Design Your Own Protocol – Nicolai Davidsson

Sanna/ November 15, 2017/ Conference, Development, Security

“One of the first lessons of cryptography is “don’t roll your own crypto” but we were bold enough to ignore it”, says Nicolai. “Single Sign-On is so 2016 which is why we’d like to introduce its replacement, Forever Alone Sign-On – FASO. This talk will discuss one of the ugliest SSO solutions you’ll ever see, its updated, slightly less ugly, iteration, and, ultimately, FASO. We’ll discuss the use cases, questionable decisions made during the planning process, the actual self-rolled, totally vulnerable, cryptography, and the even worse code architecture. In all seriousness: The talk reflects on the design process of a SSO protocol and its first two iterations, going from a semi-functional workaround to an experimental OAuth-and-the-like alternative utilizing pre-shared keys, symmetric cryptography and implicit authentication.”   Nicolai is a security researcher at zyantific and

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ROOTS: On The (In-)Security Of JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption – Dennis Detering

Sanna/ November 14, 2017/ Security

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) has evolved to the de-facto standard file format in the web used for application configuration, cross- and same-origin data exchange, as well as in Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols such as OpenID Connect. To protect integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of sensitive data, JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) was created to apply cryptographic mechanisms directly in JSON messages. We investigated the security of JOSE and present different applicable attacks on several popular libraries. We introduce JOSEPH (JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption Pentesting Helper) – our newly developed Burp Suite extension, which automatically performs security analysis on targeted applications. JOSEPH’s automatic vulnerability detection ranges from executing simple signature exclusion or signature faking techniques, which neglect JSON message integrity, up to highly complex cryptographic Bleichenbacher attacks breaking the confidentiality of encrypted JSON messages.

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